Auction-based traffic management : towards effective concurrent usage of road intersections by Schepperle, Heiko & Böhm, Klemens

















Auction-Based Traffic Management : 
Towards Effective Concurrent Usage 
of Road Intersections 
 
Heiko Schepperle, Klemens Böhm 
 
Interner Bericht 2008-1 

































Towards Effective Concurrent Usage of Road Intersections∗
Heiko Schepperle, Klemens Böhm
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Abstract
Valuation-aware traffic-control mechanisms for road in-
tersections take the valuations of reduced waiting time
of the individual drivers into account. They use agents
to avoid any disturbance of the driver, and they feature
mechanisms specifically designed for negotiating val-
uations. While such mechanisms do indeed increase
overall driver satisfaction, they only allow one vehi-
cle at a time to use the intersection so far. But the
concurrent usage of an intersection is an important
feature needed in reality. This paper proposes new
auction-based intersection-control mechanisms allow-
ing for concurrency. Their design has been challeng-
ing due to complex traffic-specific requirements like the
high number of agents involved, or varying space and
time consumption of vehicles crossing the intersection.
Experiments show that they yield a significantly higher
degree of overall driver satisfaction than state-of-the-art
mechanisms.
1 Introduction
Valuation-aware traffic-control mechanisms for road in-
tersections take the valuations of reduced waiting time
of the individual drivers into account [12, 13]. For in-
stance, think of a salesman driving to a customer. He
would be willing to pay some money to arrive ear-
lier. Another driver would only be willing to pay less
because his valuation is lower. Respective systems
typically comprise driver-assistance systems which ex-
change the valuations of their drivers with other vehi-
cles or the infrastructure.
∗This work is part of the project DAMAST (Driver Assis-
tance using Multi-Agent Systems in Traffic) (http://www.ipd.uni-
karlsruhe.de/%7Edamast/) which is partially funded by init innova-
tion in traffic systems AG (http://www.initag.com/).
Our goal is the design of effective mechanisms for
intersection control, i.e., mechanisms which reduce the
average waiting time weighted by the driver valuations.
Existing solutions either support concurrent usage of
the intersection but are not valuation-aware, e.g., traf-
fic lights or reservation-based systems [1, 2], or are
valuation-aware but do not feature concurrency, e.g.,
[12, 13]. Assuming no concurrency at intersections
is not realistic. Thus, the combination of valuation-
awareness and concurrency in intersection control is an
open issue and promises a significant reduction of aver-
age weighted waiting time.
Any intersection-control system mediates between
road users with opposing goals. The system offers time
slots, i.e., the privilege to cross the intersection during
a certain period of time, to road users. The valuation-
aware system comprises a mechanism specifying how
road users can negotiate a time slot. The design of
such mechanisms is important because they affect ne-
gotiation strategies and the outcome of the system as a
whole [11]. Because valuations are private information,
a market approach is appropriate [8]. Auctions are suit-
able to identify the drivers with the highest valuations
[8], and we focus on auction-based mechanisms using
software agents. We propose two new auction-based
mechanisms for intersection control allowing for con-
currency, Free Choice and Clocked. Free Choice lets
the winning vehicle freely choose a time slot within an
interval, while Clocked auctions intervals whose dura-
tion is the one of a time slot. To our knowledge, they
are the first ’location-aware’ auction mechanisms, i.e.,
auctions where the position of the participants plays a
role.
The design of valuation-aware intersection-control
mechanisms is challenging. One reason is that vehicles
are physical objects and subject to restricting physical
laws, e.g., speed and acceleration limitations. Concur-
rency adds to the complexity: In particular, the mech-
anisms should yield a high degree of concurrent usage
of the intersection and at the same time prevent vehicles
from colliding. Given that vehicles with different valua-
tions and different speeds may arrive at the intersection
at any time, this requirement is far from trivial. Fur-
ther, auctions should be designed such that they do not
degenerate, e.g., they should have more than one par-
ticipant. One-participant auctions tend to occur if the
auctions are executed immediately one after another.
We compare both mechanisms to a state-of-the-art
mechanism for intersection control which uses agents
as well but is not valuation-aware. We determine their
effectiveness for different vehicle densities and differ-
ent degrees of concurrency. Our evaluation shows that
both the number of vehicles and the degree of concur-
rency influence the effectiveness. Free Choice always
reduces average weighted waiting time (up to 38.1%).
With Clocked, this is only true for lower degrees of con-
currency and high demands.
This project is part of a larger effort where, together
with a supplier of intelligent transportation systems, we
explore the opportunities and bounds of market-based
traffic management. Naturally, this paper investigates
one specific problem and leaves aside other ones, e.g.,
legacy issues, i.e., old vehicles or pedestrians without
the equipment assumed here. We also assume that vehi-
cles cannot overtake each other in the vicinity of an in-
tersection; this is in line with traffic regulations in many
countries. Another assumption is that robust and cheap
mobile communication mechanisms will be available in
the future. Further, this paper does not consider cooper-
ation among different intersections. These assumptions
are realistic, at least when looking at the future. Today,
they already hold for some closed traffic areas such as
transship areas of seaports or company premises.
Paper outline: Section 2 discusses related work and
Section 3 preliminaries. We describe our new mech-
anisms in Section 4. Section 5 is our evaluation and
Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Work
We discuss agent-based approaches for traffic manage-
ment which we deem important for our work.
The reservation-based mechanism of [1, 2] is the first
agent-based intersection-control mechanism for road
traffic relying on data provided by vehicles. It uses a
first-in first-out strategy and does not feature valuation-
awareness. An extension [3] introduces priorities for
emergency vehicles. Traffic-signal priority system, e.g.,
[6], prioritize public transportation. [3, 6] prioritize
only a small fraction of the overall traffic and ignore
the valuations of other road users. The first valuation-
aware mechanisms for road-traffic control are proposed
in [13]. There, driver-assistance agents can exchange
the time slots that have been allocated to them. [12]
compares an auction mechanism for time-slot allocation
to a first-in first-out mechanism. In both approaches the
scenario is limited: There is no support for concurrency.
[12, 13] also do not investigate how valuation-aware
mechanisms perform with different vehicle densities.
Next to agent-based mechanisms for traffic control
at road intersections, there are related agent-based ap-
proaches for air-traffic control. [7] uses agents for ar-
rival, departure and gate planning in air traffic. If a plan
has to be changed, agents representing the airlines ne-
gotiate plan-repair schemes. The time frame for plan-
ning is several days. In road traffic, it is seconds to a
few minutes at best. Therefore, an initial plan has to be
negotiated automatically while driving, and deviations
from the plan are more unlikely. Thus, road traffic calls
for an effective initial allocation of time slots, unlike
plan repair.
[9] uses agents to plan the deicing of airplanes at air-
ports. Agents representing the planes negotiate time
slots at the deicing stations. The authors propose
two mechanisms: a valuation-aware Vickrey auction
and a reservation-based mechanism with decommit-
ment penalties. The authors conclude that auctions are
more efficient but less fair, i.e., waiting times have a
larger standard deviation. The approach is similar to
[12] and has the same drawbacks: Only one plane is de-
iced per time, and deicing takes the same time for every
plane. The scenario is less complex than in [12] because
the order of arrival of planes does not matter.
Summing up, realistic valuation-aware mechanisms
for traffic control at road intersections are missing.
Thus, we need such mechanisms which allow vehicles
to cross an intersection in parallel without interfering
with each other. These mechanisms must be effec-
tive, i.e., they must reduce the average weighted waiting
time.
3 Preliminaries
Underlying Definitions. Incoming and outgoing lanes
are part of the neighborhood of an intersection. Inter-
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section lanes are the lanes which cross the intersection
and turn into various directions. Vehicles approach the
intersection on incoming lanes and leave it on outgoing
lanes. Intersection lanes are conflicting if they touch or
intersect each other. We refer to the area used by two
different intersection lanes as conflict area.
The overpass time of a trip is the time a vehicle
would need for the entire trip if it was the only vehicle
in the neighborhood, i.e., no obstruction due to other
vehicles or traffic-control mechanisms. By definition,
the waiting time of a vehicle is the difference of the ac-
tual travel time and the overpass time. A driver has a
valuation for reducing his waiting time. In the follow-
ing, this valuation is the amount of money one would be
willing to pay if his waiting time was reduced by one
second. While other valuation functions are conceiv-
able as well, we limit ourselves to linear ones in this pa-
per. The weighted waiting time is the waiting time of a
driver multiplied with his valuation. In our experiments,
we will give much importance to the average waiting
time (avgWT) and the average weighted waiting time
(avgWWT) of all vehicles. The minimum approaching
time tapproach,min is the minimum time a vehicle needs
to drive from the beginning of the neighborhood where
it can request a time slot to the beginning of the inter-
section where it can use the slot. Our objective is not to
increase the benefit of the operator of an intersection, so
we focus on effectiveness i.e., reducing avgWWT. This
corresponds to increasing the overall satisfaction.
The demand is the average number of vehicles arriv-
ing on an incoming lane per hour. With n incoming
lanes, the intersection has to deal with n times the de-
mand. With intersection-control mechanisms, a driver
can earn or spend money. His utility is the monetary
balance minus the weighted waiting time.
Example 1 Let the valuation of a driver per second be
0.1. If he has to wait 20 seconds, his utility is −20 ∗
0.1 = −2. If he procures another time slot by spending
0.5, and if this exchange brings down his waiting time
to 12 seconds, his utility increases to −0.5− 12 ∗ 0.1 =
−1.7.
We distinguish three degrees of concurrency. We call
a setting where only one vehicle can cross the intersec-
tion per time intersection exclusive (IE), i.e., concur-
rency is not supported. We refer to a situation where ve-
hicles can cross the intersection concurrently only if the
intersection lanes used are not conflicting lane exclusive
(LE). A setting where vehicles can cross the intersection
concurrently as long as no conflict area contains more
than one vehicle is conflict area exclusive (CAE). CAE
is the highest possible degree of concurrency and is less
restrictive than LE. With LE in turn, vehicles have to
wait until the preceding vehicle on the same incoming
lane has left the intersection. Time slots are conflicting
if they cannot be used simultaneously, according to the
degree of concurrency used.
Architecture. To avoid distraction of the drivers,
we use driver-assistance systems. Drivers can configure
their systems in advance, in analogy to a route guidance
system. The systems then act autonomously. Thus,
software agents are appropriate. Driver-assistance sys-
tems are a platform for driver-assistance agents (DAA).
We also assume that all intersections host an intersec-
tion agent (IA). While the DAAs represent the inter-
ests of the drivers, the IAs represent the interests of
the traffic planners/authorities. To ease presentation, we
may use ’vehicle’ and ’driver-assistance agent’ synony-
mously in what follows.
4 Intersection-Control Mecha-
nisms
This section presents two new mechanisms for intersec-
tion control, Free Choice and Clocked. To do so, we
describe a first-in first-out mechanism (Time-Slot Re-
quest) which is not valuation-aware that will serve as a
reference point for our evaluation. This is appropriate
because [1] has shown that such a mechanism outper-
forms traffic lights. We then describe an auction mech-
anism for intersection control in abstract terms which
subsumes the new mechanisms, before going into de-
tails.
The mechanisms are robust in the sense that – due
to the physical characteristics of the traffic scenario –
unexpected events can occur. For example, the vehicle
in front may slow down, or communication may take
too long. Thus, vehicles can opt out, e.g., by declining
a time slot offered.
4.1 Time-Slot Request (TSR)
We call our implementation of the mechanism of [1]
Time-Slot Request (TSR). We adapt and deploy the FIPA
Request Interaction Protocol [5] to implement TSR.
Protocol. Vehicles which approach an intersection
send a request to the intersection agent (IA). It con-
tains the earliest point of time to cross the intersection
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(desired time-slot beginning), the intersection lane to
use and the id of the vehicle in front (front vehicle id).
The former two are necessary to allocate a time slot.
The order of requests does not necessarily reflect the
order of vehicles driving on the same lane. Because ve-
hicles cannot overtake, the IA has to preserve their order
on a lane. To accomplish this, the IA uses the id of the
preceding vehicle.
The IA processes the requests of vehicles in their or-
der of arrival (first-in first-out). The IA checks if the
preceding vehicle has already been assigned a time slot.
If not, it cannot assign a time slot to the requesting ve-
hicle. Otherwise the order of time slots may become
different from the one of vehicles on the lane. Thus, it
refuses the request (refuse). In this case, the vehicle
has to repeat the request. If the preceding vehicle has
already been assigned a time slot, the IA computes the
next free time slot for the lane requested which is not
earlier than the desired beginning and the time slot of
the preceding vehicle. The IA proposes this time slot to
the vehicle (agree).
If this message takes too much time, or the vehicle in
front has slowed down surprisingly, the vehicle might
not be able to use the time slot proposed. If so, it sends
a refuse, otherwise an agree. In case of agree, the
vehicle can now adapt its speed to arrive at the intersec-
tion exactly on time. However, as long as the allocation
of the slot is not confirmed, it must not enter the inter-
section. In case of agree, the IA tries to allocate the
slot. This may fail if another conflicting allocation has
taken place meanwhile. If so, the IA returns failure,
otherwise it confirms (inform). The vehicle can use
the time slot only after the confirmation. If the request
fails, the vehicle repeats it.
4.2 Auction Mechanisms
Now we present the auction mechanisms. An auction
consists of two steps, the contact step and the allocation
step. In the contact step, the vehicle contacts the IA and
requests a time slot. In the allocation step the IA auc-
tions slots to vehicles which have requested one before.
During an auction no other auctions take place.
4.2.1 Contact Step
Vehicles request a time slot (request) from the IA.
Because vehicles cannot overtake, if the vehicle in front
has not yet requested a slot, the IA refuses the request
(refuse). Otherwise, unlike TSR, it does not compute
the next free slot immediately. It returns agree saying
that the vehicle will soon receive a call for proposals.
Vehicles which have received a refusal issue another re-
quest.
The IA uses the requests to update its limited knowl-
edge of the current traffic situation. It maintains a wait-
ing queue for each incoming lane. It stores the desired
time-slot beginning, the front vehicle id, the intersec-
tion lane and the incoming lane of each vehicle. It adds
the vehicle having issued a request to the queue if the
queue is empty, or if the front vehicle reported is last in
the queue. Vehicles are removed from the queue after
having entered the intersection.
4.2.2 Allocation Step
The IA auctions one slot per auction to the vehicles
which have requested a slot in the contact step (Fig-
ure 1). Note that, if concurrency is supported, several
time slots may be auctioned off for the same or overlap-
ping periods of time. The IA does not necessarily offer
the same slot to each vehicle. This is because the inter-
section lane to use, the duration and the beginning of an
appropriate slot depend on the vehicle. The IA only an-
nounces an auction interval [Tauct,b, Tauct,e] with be-
ginning Tauct,b and end Tauct,e. It determines lower
and upper bounds of the auctioned time slot, i.e., the
time slot of the winning vehicle must always be within
this interval. The winning vehicle receives the earliest
possible time slot within the interval given its current
position and its maximum speed, next to other condi-
tions.
A vehicle which could receive a slot in the next auc-
tion is a candidate, i.e., a vehicle which has requested
but not yet received a slot, which is the first in its queue
without time slot, and for which a possible slot in the
auction interval exists. A candidate time slot is the ear-
liest possible slot in the auction interval for a candidate.
A time slot must be later than the slot of the preceding
vehicle. If the next free time slot begins earlier than the
auction interval, the IA computes the earliest free slot
within the interval. If there is no such a time slot, the
vehicle is not a candidate and is not invited.
Example 2 Let the auction interval be from
Tauct,b=09:45:00 to Tauct,e=09:45:15, and let
two candidates C1 and C2 take part in the auction.
C1 is a right turning vehicle and needs 6 seconds to
cross the intersection. C2 is a left turning vehicle
and needs 12 seconds. Because the intersection lane
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Figure 1: Contract Net Interaction Protocol
of C1 is reserved for other vehicles for the first four
seconds of the auction interval, the candidate time
slot of C1 would be from 09:45:04 to 09:45:10. If C2
won, its candidate time slot would be from 09:45:00 to
09:45:12.
Several exogenous parameters define the auctions.
The IA has to decide when to start the next auction (auc-
tion start time, Tstart). Executing an auction takes time,
and vehicles need some time to reach the beginning
of the intersection and to accelerate. The respective
parameter is the maximum reaction time (treact,max).
It determines the minimum difference between auction
start time Tstart and the beginning of the auction in-
terval Tauct,b. In the real world, this would not be an
exogenous parameter, but it is one when looking at our
experimental platform in isolation. Section 5 will dis-
cuss our choice of parameter values. Further, different
auction-interval lengths are conceivable, as we will ex-
plain.
Auction Protocol. We use the FIPA Contract Net
Interaction Protocol [4] (Figure 1) for the auctions.
The IA sends all m candidates a call for proposals
(cfp, 1) with the auction interval and their candidate
time slot attached. n is the number of candidates re-
plying. If a candidate cannot keep the time slot, i.e.,
cannot reach the intersection in time, it sends a refusal
(refuse, 2), otherwise a proposal (propose, 3). The
proposal contains the offer, i.e., the money one is will-
ing to pay for the slot. The IA receives i refusals and j
proposals. Thus, if j > 0, the IA identifies the best
one and the price the candidate has to pay. If there
are more than one best proposal, one of them is cho-
sen randomly. The IA then allocates the slot and sends
an accept-proposal (5) (l = 1) to the winner. It
sends a reject-proposal (4) to all other k = j− l
candidates which have sent a proposal. From now on,
the IA cannot auction off time slots which conflict with
the current one.
If a vehicle receives a reject, it waits for further calls
for proposals. When receiving an accept, it checks if
it can still keep the slot. If not, it sends a failure
(6) and waits for another call. Otherwise, it sends back
an inform (7). The vehicle can now adapt its driving
speed to its time slot.
In the failure case, the IA undoes the allocation of the
slot so that it can be auctioned off again. The vehicle
will receive further call for proposals in the future.
Discussion. We use a sealed-bid auction. Although a
first-price auction could be used, we use a second-price
auction for the price determination as used in Internet
auctions [10]. The auction type determines the bidding
strategies, which are beyond the scope of this paper and
future work.
In the protocol used, the IA allocates the time slot be-
fore sending the accept-proposal. If the vehicle
replies failure, the IA has to undo the allocation. An
alternative might be to allocate the time slot only after
the vehicle has confirmed sending inform. But this al-
ternative is problematic: if the inform message gets lost
or takes too much time, the vehicle would use a time
slot which has not been allocated yet. This could lead
to accidents.
4.2.3 Free Choice
With Free Choice, the auction interval is a window
moving along the time axis. The IA lets the vehicle
that has just won the auction choose its time slot within
this interval. It seems obvious to have an interval with
fixed duration and to move it along the time axis con-
tinuously. However, this has a drawback: The end of
the interval changes continuously, and all vehicles may
become candidate one after another. There would be
only one vehicle participating in each auction, at least
when the execution time of auctions is negligible, and
if they take place continuously. Namely, vehicles hav-
ing arrived earlier would already have obtained a time
slot. Free Choice would be equal to TSR. To avoid this,
the end of the auction interval Tauct,e moves along in a
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discrete sequence of steps of fixed length (tstep). The
effect of this discretization is that it is likely that there
are now several vehicles competing for a slot in the new
auction interval. Formula 2 below yields the end of the
auction interval at the current point of time. Its length
is not fixed, since its begin point (Tauct,b) moves for-
ward continuously. Formula 1 yields this begin point.
The auction interval has a minimal length, referred to
as tint,min.
We distinguish between successful and unsuccessful
auctions. An auction is unsuccessful if the IA receives
no proposals, or if the winning vehicle replies with a
failure. Otherwise, an auction is successful. The min-
imal auction gap Tgap is the minimal gap between the
auction start times Tstart of two subsequent auctions if
the first one has not been successful. This gap avoids
initiating unnecessary auctions, i.e., auctions without
any candidates.
If the last auction Ai has been successful, the next
auction Ai+1 is initiated immediately thereafter. Other-
wise, the next auction Ai+1 is initiated after the mini-
mal auction gap Tgap has passed. Because of the maxi-
mum reaction time treact,max the beginning of the auc-
tion interval is as follows:
Tauct,b = Tstart + treact,max (1)
This means that Tauct,b is different for every auction.
The end of the auction interval Tauct,e should be
within the interval [Tauct,b;Tauct,b + tapproach,min]. It
remains unchanged for every auction until tstep has
passed. It is then increased by tstep using the follow-
ing formula:
Tauct,e = (bTstart/tstepc+1)× tstep)+ tint,min (2)
This means that the duration of the auction interval
shrinks from tstep + tint,min − treact,max to tint,min −
treact,max, and then its duration is reset again to tstep +
tint,min − treact,max.
Example 3 Let the minimum auction interval tint,min
be 30.0s, let tstep be 10s, and let treact,max be 5s. If
the auction start time Tstart is 0s, the auction interval
begins at 5s and ends at 40s. Thus, the length of the
interval is 35s. Five seconds later the beginning of the
interval is 10s, and the end remains unchanged. The
length of the interval is now 30s. If the auction starts at
10s, the interval beginning changes to 15 and the end
to 50s. The length is 35s again.
4.2.4 Clocked
With Clocked, the duration of the auction interval is
fixed. It is always set to the maximal time-slot duration,
i.e., the time the vehicle with the smallest acceleration
needs to cross the intersection on the longest lane and
accelerating from zero to the speed limit. When there
are no more candidates for the current auction interval,
the interval beginning at the end of the previous auction
interval becomes the new auction interval.
With Clocked, a time slot can only overlap with an-
other one if both slots were allocated in auctions with
the same auction interval. This seems to be a restric-
tion. However, we deem Clocked worth to be inves-
tigated: These restrictions might be helpful when we
combine auctions with mechanisms which allow trad-
ing time slots won in an auction before.
Clocked features one further exogenous parameter:
the maximum difference toffset,max between Tstart and
Tauct,b.
With Clocked, another auction Ai+1 is initiated im-
mediately after the last auction Ai has completed suc-
cessfully. In this case the auction interval remains un-
changed. Otherwise it changes to the next auction inter-
val.
If a time slot begins too early, the vehicle may not be
able to keep it. Thus, we have to avoid auctions whose
auction interval is too early. This is the case if:
Tauct,b < Tstart + treact,max (3)
In this case we set the beginning of the auction interval
to Tstart + treact,max.
Auctions with auction intervals too far in the future
have to be avoided. This is because no ’interested’ ve-
hicle has already entered the neighborhood. We say that
the beginning of the auction interval Tauct,b is too far in
the future if:
Tauct,b > Tstart + toffset,max (4)
In this case, the IA does not initiate an auction as long
as the inequation holds.
This mechanism is called Clocked because time slots
are clocked with the maximal time-slot duration. This
means that several vehicles can cross the intersection at
the same time, but only if their time slots are within the
auction interval. This does not mean that all time slots
must begin at the same time. – Although the duration
of the auction interval remains fixed, Clocked does not
degenerate to TSR because the beginning of the auction
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interval Tauct,b as well as the end Tauct,e do not change
continuously with every auction.
Example 4 Let the maximum duration of a time
slot be 12s. If the auction interval ranges from
Tauct,b=00:10:00 to Tauct,e=00:10:12 a right turning
candidate may win the slot ranging from 00:10:06 to
00:10:09.
4.2.5 Subsidies
Both Free Choice and Clocked have a drawback: Vehi-
cles with high valuations may be stuck behind vehicles
with very low valuations. This is because vehicles with
very low valuations may loose several auctions in se-
quence. So far, the vehicles behind it cannot influence
this. We overcome this problem by allowing these ve-
hicles to subsidize the bids of vehicles in front.
If subsidies are allowed the IA does not only send the
call for proposals to all candidates. Any vehicle which
has already requested a slot and is waiting behind a can-
didate also receives it, and a flag is set indicating that the
call for proposals actually is a call for subsidy. These
vehicles can then decide to subsidize their front vehi-
cle or not. The subsidy depends on the expected benefit
of moving forward one step in the queue. The IA col-
lects bids and subsidies. All bids and subsidies from
one lane are added up. The candidate wins which has
made a proposal and which has the highest accumulated
bid. The price to pay is the second highest accumulated
bid. The winning candidate and its subsidizers receive
an accept-proposal (l ≥ 1), all other vehicles receive a
refuse-proposal. Each winning vehicle pays a share of
the price proportional to its bid.
Subsidies affect the bidding strategies. For instance,
candidates might be tempted to offer less than their true
valuation hoping for subsidies. Vehicles waiting behind
might offer less than their true valuation as a counter-
measure.
4.2.6 Further Possible Extensions
The auction mechanisms proposed here do not yet avoid
starvation, i.e., in theory, a vehicle might have to wait
for an infinite amount of time. The IA can avoid starva-
tion if it interrupts the auctions when the waiting time of
a vehicle exceeds an upper bound, lets the vehicle cross
the intersection, and resumes. This clearly influences
the bidding strategies of the DAAs. [12] indicates that
starvation typically is not crucial because the effect on
drivers with very low valuations is moderate if subsidies
are feasible.
The IA earns money by auctioning time slots to ve-
hicles. This may reduce user acceptance. As long
as it keeps this money, the mechanism is not budget-
balanced. But the IA may return the money earned
to the drivers, immediately or after some time, e.g.,
by reducing taxes. It can return the money according
to different schemes, e.g., in proportion to the waiting
time. In any case, this extension also affects the bidding
strategies.
The auction mechanism might be improved if not
only DAAs from the same incoming lane but also DAAs
from different incoming lanes can form coalitions, if
they do not use conflicting intersection lanes. These
coalitions might prevent other DAAs whose intersec-
tion lane conflicts with both of their intersection lanes
to win the next slot. This extension influences the bid-
ding strategies as well.
5 Evaluation
With our evaluation, we are particularly interested in the
average weighted waiting time avgWWT with the vari-
ous mechanisms, for different demands and degrees of
concurrency. We have implemented both Free Choice
and Clocked with subsidies and no other extensions.
We always evaluate the mechanisms with subsidies be-
cause [12] has shown that subsidies further reduce the
avgWWT.
Setting. All experiments share the following set-
tings. The intersection consists of four directions. From
each direction there are two incoming and two outgoing
lanes. The left incoming lane allows to turn left or to go
straight. The right incoming lane allows to turn right or
to go straight. The length of each incoming respectively
outgoing lane is 800m. The radius of the intersection
is 25m. For each of the eight incoming lanes vehicles
are randomly generated using an exponential distribu-
tion with the desired demand as average. Because of
the intersection layout each vehicle approaching on a
certain incoming lane has two possible routes. Each
route is chosen randomly with probability 0.5. After
having driven 50m, the vehicle is allowed to request a
slot from the intersection agent. The valuation per sec-
ond of reduced waiting time is exponentially distributed
with mean 0.01. As long as we do not know all realis-
tic bidding strategies and their distribution we assume
that each driver always bids and subsidizes his valua-
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tion per second of reduced waiting time. In prelimi-
nary experiments, we have examined the influence of
lower bids and subsidies with Free Choice. The bids
were randomly distributed between 80% and 100% and
subsidies between 50% and 90% of the valuation per
second. Because we did not detect a significant effect,
we do not consider lower bids and subsidies in the fol-
lowing experiments. All vehicles enter the traffic net
with 50km/h, which is also the speed limit assumed
here. We assume that there are different vehicle types,
which are equally distributed, and whose possible ac-
celerations range from 1.4m/s2 to 3.0m/s2. All vehi-
cles decelerate with 3.0m/s2.
The simulation is space-continuous and time-
discrete, i.e., consisting of subsequent steps. Based on
preliminary experiments, the duration of each simula-
tion step is 400ms. In each simulation run 63 minutes
are simulated. To avoid startup effects, we ignore the
vehicles which leave the traffic net in the first three min-
utes.
Because the start time, the vehicle type, the route and
the valuation of each driver are chosen randomly, we
always execute five simulation runs with the same five
seeds for each setting. This lets us compare the ith sim-
ulation run of one setting to the ith simulation run of an-
other setting. By doing so, we always compare the same
situation, i.e., the same vehicles with the same route and
the same valuation.
Calibration of Free Choice. In preliminary experi-
ments we identify appropriate configurations for Free
Choice. It offers four parameters to optimize: the
time after which the end of the auction interval changes
(tstep), its minimum duration (tint,min), the maximum
reaction time (treact,max), and the minimum auction
gap (Tgap). We identify adequate values for tstep and
tint,min in the following experiment. We set the min-
imum auction gap Tgap to the duration of a simulation
step, i.e., 400ms. Preliminary simulations have shown
that the value 5s for treact,max is sufficient.
If the minimum auction interval tint,min exceeds the
minimum approaching time tapproach,min every vehicle
participates in an auction immediately after requesting
a time slot. Since this may lead to many auctions with
only one participant, we decided to evaluate different
values for the minimum auction interval tint,min and
for the period of time after which the end of the auc-
tion interval changes (tstep), as follows: Because of the
speed limit of 50km/h and the maximum request dis-
tance of 800m−50m = 750m the minimum approach-
ing time tapproach,min is 54s. Thus, we examine the
Figure 2: Average weighted waiting time (avgWWT) of
Free Choice in different settings
Figure 3: Average waiting time (avgWT) of Free
Choice in different settings
average (weighted) waiting time using combinations of
25%, 50%, 75%, and 100% of 54s, i.e., 13.5s, 27.0s,
40.5s, and 54.0s for both parameters evaluated. We
have 16 settings because we simulate four times four
combinations. We always use conflict area exclusive
and set the demand to 250. For each setting we execute
five simulation runs and compute the mean of the av-
erage (weighted) waiting times. Figures 2 and 3 show
these mean values for all settings. The x-axis is the min-
imum auction interval tint,min. The different curves
stand for different values of tstep.
The experiment shows that higher values of tint,min
decrease both the avgWT and the avgWWT. The influ-
ence of tstep is rather limited. For minimum auction
intervals lower than 54s the differences of the average
weighted waiting times are negligible for different val-
ues of tstep. In the case of tint,min = 54s the value
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Figure 4: Average weighted waiting time (avgWWT) of
Clocked in different settings
13.5s for tstep leads to the minimal avgWWT of 0.057.
We use these parameter settings in the next experiment.
Calibration of Clocked. We now identify good con-
figurations for Clocked. Clocked has two parameters
to adjust: the maximum reaction time treact,max and
the maximum difference between auction start time and
the beginning of the auction interval toffset,max. We set
treact,max to 5s, according to preliminary experiments.
In two treatments, we evaluate the effect of the fol-
lowing values for toffset,max on the average (weighted)
waiting time: 25%, 50%, 75%, 100%, 125% and 150%
of the minimum approaching time tapproach,min, i.e.,
13.5s, 27.0s, 40.5s, 54.0s, 67.5s, and 81.0s. In the first
treatment we use intersection exclusive and a demand
of 50, in the second one we use conflict area exclusive
and a demand of 250. For each setting we execute five
simulation runs and compute the mean of the average
(weighted) waiting times. Figures 4 and 5 show these
mean values for all settings.
In the treatment with intersection exclusive both the
avgWT and the avgWWT do not change if toffset,max
increases up to 100% of the minimum approaching time
tapproach,min. For the treatment with conflict area ex-
clusive we observe a continuous increase. If the val-
ues exceeds 100% of tapproach,min in both treatments
the avgWWT increases significantly. This is not sur-
prising because most vehicles will take part in the auc-
tion immediately after requesting a time slot. Thus,
the auctions mostly have only one participant, and the
valuation is not taken into account. This means that
toffset,max = 13.5s leads to the lowest avgWWT. We
set toffset,max to this value in what follows.
Treatments. We now compare the average
Figure 5: Average waiting time (avgWT) of Clocked in
different settings
(weighted) waiting times of Free Choice and Clocked
to the ones of TSR. We execute one treatment for each
degree of concurrency for each mechanism. In the inter-
section exclusive (IE) treatment we simulate a demand
of 25, 50, and 75. In the lane exclusive (LE) treatment
we simulate a demand from 25 to 225 in steps of 25. In
the conflict area exclusive (CAE) treatment we simulate
a demand from 25 to 300 in steps of 25. The difference
is due to the fact that the maximum throughput of the
intersection depends on the different degrees of concur-
rency. If the demand gets near or exceeds the maxi-
mum throughput of the intersection the waiting queues
at the incoming lanes just keep becoming longer. Ob-
viously, this increases both waiting time and weighted
waiting time. Thus, we omit higher values in Figures 6,
7, and 8. We expect both Free Choice and Clocked to
perform best for CAE independent of the demand. Next
to the absolute avgWWT we also compute the relative
differences of the avgWWT of Free Choice and Clocked
compared to TSR.
Free Choice vs. TSR. We plot the avgWWT for CAE
in Figure 6 and for LE in Figure 7. The values for the
three variants of IE are very similar, so we only plot one
curve to avoid clutter in the figure. Further, we use a
logarithmic scale for the ordinate. To ease comparisons
of the values for the different degrees, both figures con-
tain all curves for TSR. The evaluation shows (Figures 6
and 7) that the avgWWT is lower for Free Choice (FC)
than for TSR for all degrees of concurrency and for all
demands. This means that Free Choice is always ef-
fective. The avgWWT for CAE is always lower than
for LE, which in turn is lower than the one for IE. This
result is independent of the mechanism used with any
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Figure 6: Average weighted waiting time (avgWWT)
using conflict area exclusive (CAE)
Figure 7: Average weighted waiting time (avgWWT)
using lane exclusive (LE)
Figure 8: Relative difference of average weighted wait-
ing time (avgWWT) of Clocked vs. Free Choice
degree of concurrency.
The highest relative difference for CAE occurs for
the demand of 250 (average: 27.8%, 0.95 confi-
dence interval (ci): [22.6%,31.8%]). For LE it oc-
curs for the demand of 150 (average: 38.1%, 0.95 ci:
[37.8%,38.3%]). With IE, the highest relative differ-
ence occurs for the demand of 60 (average: 34.5%, 0.95
ci: [22.0%,40.5%]). In the latter case, we have eval-
uated all demands from 25 to 75 in steps of 5. Note
that this does not mean that, say, LE performs better for
the demand of 150 than CAE. The relative difference
is computed using TSR with the same degree of con-
currency. This means that CAE should always be used
when possible.
The average waiting time avgWT for Free Choice is
– in the worst case – only slightly higher than for TSR.
Note that a slight increase of the average waiting time is
acceptable because the average weighted waiting time
is reduced.
Clocked vs. TSR. Figures 6 and 7 show the avgWWT
of Clocked (CL) and TSR for both CAE and LE. For
CAE it is always higher with Clocked than with TSR.
Thus, Clocked is not effective for CAE. For LE Clocked
is effective for a demand from 100 to 225. For IE it is
effective only for a demand of 50 and 75.
For LE the highest relative difference occurs for
the demand of 150 (average: 41.8%, 0.95 ci:
[16.9%,53.2%]). Using IE the highest relative differ-
ence occurs for the demand of 60 (average: 40.0%, 0.95
ci: [31.7%,44.0%]).
Clocked vs. Free Choice. We compute the relative
difference of avgWWT of Clocked compared to Free
Choice in Figure 8. Because Clock is not good at all
with CAE we omit it from this figure. For LE the fig-
ure shows that Free Choice outperforms Clocked for
demands below 150. For higher demands the differ-
ence is not significant. For IE Free Choice is signif-
icantly better for a demand of 25 (average: -23.3%,
0.95 ci: [-75.2%,-6.6%]). For a demand of 50 Clocked
outperforms Free Choice (average: 7.0%, 0.95 ci:
[3.9%,9.0%]). For 75 the difference is not significant.
Discussion. It has been expected that higher degrees
of concurrency reduce the average weighted waiting
time. The restriction of Clocked that slots from dif-
ferent auction intervals may not overlap affects its per-
formance more for higher degrees of concurrency and
lower demands. Except for CAE Clocked catches up
compared to Free Choice with increasing demand. This
might be because Free Choice yields gaps between time
slots more often which are too small for other vehicles.
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6 Conclusions
This paper has proposed two novel auction mechanisms
for traffic control at intersections, Free Choice and
Clocked. They are the first mechanisms which are both
valuation-aware and allow for a realistic, i.e., concur-
rent, usage of road intersections. Free Choice is always
effective, i.e., it reduces the average weighted waiting
time avgWWT by up to 38.1%. Clocked is only ef-
fective for lower degrees of concurrency and for higher
demands.
In the future, we will examine bidding strategies and
the combination with bilateral exchanges of time slots.
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